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- Introduction
- Part I
- I. Assessment (3)
- A. Assessment of the Current Situation In Iraq (0)
- 1. Security (3)
- 2. Politics (4)
- 3. Economics (2)
- 4. International Support (2)
- 5. Conclusions (0)
- B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq (1)
- C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq (0)
- 1. Precipitate Withdrawal (3)
- 2. Staying the Course (0)
- 3. More Troops for Iraq (0)
- 4. Devolution to Three Regions (3)
- D. Achieving Our Goals (2)
- Part II
- II. The Way Forward (1)
- A. The External Approach:Building an International Consensus (2)
- 1. The New Diplomatic Offensive (4)
- 2. The Iraq International Support Group (4)
- 3. Dealing with Iran and Syria (7)
- 4. The Wider Regional Context (9)
- B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves (0)
- 1. Performance on Milestones (3)
- 2. National Reconciliation (6)
- 3. Security and Military Forces (4)
- 4. Police and Criminal Justice (2)
- 5. The Oil Sector (1)
- 6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance (1)
- 7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review (1)
- 8. U.S. Personnel (2)
- 9. Intelligence (2)
- Appendices
- Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations (0)
- Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions (0)
- Iraq Study Group Consultations (0)
- Expert Working Groups and Military Senior Advisor Panel (0)
- The Iraq Study Group (0)
- James A. Baker, III - Co-Chair (0)
- Lee H. Hamilton - Co-Chair (0)
- Lawrence S. Eagleburger - Member (0)
- Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. - Member (0)
- Edwin Meese III - Member (0)
- Sandra Day O - Connor - Member (0)
- Leon E. Panetta - Member (0)
- William J. Perry - Member (0)
- Charles S. Robb - Member (0)
- Alan K. Simpson - Member (0)
- Iraq Study Group Support (0)
- Comments
- About
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